Journal of Business & Technology Law
Volume 14 | Issue 2

Article 6

From Hanging Chads to Data Hacks: Maintaining
Election Integrity in the Digital Age
Paige Reinauer

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl
Recommended Citation
Paige Reinauer, From Hanging Chads to Data Hacks: Maintaining Election Integrity in the Digital Age, 14 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 533 ()
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol14/iss2/6

This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Business & Technology Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information,
please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.





From Hanging Chads to Data
Hacks: Maintaining Election
Integrity in the Digital Age
PAIGE REINAUER*©
INTRODUCTION
After the tumultuous 2000 presidential election, many
states opted to conduct their elections through electronic
voting devices.1 However, with concerns about data breach,
voter fraud, and election hacking becoming increasingly
prominent in America’s public discourse, reaching an apex
during the 2016 presidential election, many states have
passed legislation reverting to a paper-based method.2 This
has left the United States with a patchwork approach to
voting technology. Importantly, many of these new
approaches to voting corrected past identified problems,
whilst simultaneously uncovering new vulnerabilities.3 This
paper seeks to analyze the history of voting technology in
the United States, the current state of voting, and the
implications of the different approaches to voting technology
utilized by the states. Ultimately, this paper will conclude

* J.D. 2019, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
© Paige Reinauer 2019.
1 Clive Thompson, Can You Count on Voting Machines?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Jan. 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/06
Vote-t.html.
2 Elizabeth Weise, Paper Ballots are Back in Vogue Thanks to Russian
Hacking Fears, USA TODAY (Sep. 19, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.
usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/09/19/russia-hacking-election-fearsprompts-states-to-switch-to-paper-ballots/666020001/.
3 See infra Part VI.
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that the best and most likely way forward is through the
standardized use of scan-technology voting to address
concerns of both verifiability and efficiency.
I.

THE HISTORY OF VOTING METHODS IN
THE UNITED STATES

From the founding of the United States until the late 1800s,
hand-counted paper ballots were the only type of voting
equipment used. 4 Voters typically obtained pre-printed
ballots with the names of the candidates for which they
wished to vote.5 However, vote-buying scandals throughout
the early nineteenth century led to the “adoption of the
Australian secret ballot, which was developed in 1856.” 6
Under this system, ballots listed the names of the
candidates, and voters marked their choices in private. 7
However, hand-counted paper ballots faded in prominence
throughout the late 20th century with the emergence of
better technology, as the process of interpreting paper
ballots was both time consuming and error prone due to
undecipherable marking.8 By 2000, only 1.3% of voters in
the United States, mainly in rural areas, voted with handcounted paper ballots.9
The decline of the paper ballot coincided with the
first major advancement in voting technology, the lever
voting machine, which was developed during the early

Clive Thompson, Can You Count on Voting Machines?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Jan. 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/
06Vote-t.html.
5 Elizabeth King, How the U.S. Ended Up with Today’s Paper Ballots,
TIME (Apr. 26, 2016), http://time.com/4305508/paper-ballot-history/.
6 Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and
Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1718 (2005).
7 Id. at 1718-19.
8 Id. at 1719.
9 Id.
4
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twentieth century. 10 The lever voting machine “was
designed to address the possibility of tampering with paper
ballots, since there is no document to tamper with.” 11
However, this was not the only major pre-twenty-first
century advancement in voting technology. In 1964 a new
form of voting technology emerged, punch-card ballots, the
first technology to use computers to count votes. 12
Ultimately, these technologies nearly phased out handcounted paper ballots entirely. By 1980, during the election
between Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter, the two most
common voting systems utilized by the states were punchcard devices and lever machines.13
However, these methods also fell victim to the same
fate as hand-counted ballots. Lever machines, which were
first invented in the 1890s, seemed bulky by the late
twentieth century, and furthermore were expensive to
maintain and repair. 14 This led to these machines being
phased out over the next twenty years.15 New York was the
last state to phase out lever machines, officially retiring
them in 2010. 16 Punch cards better withstood the test of
time, maintaining relevance throughout the 1990s, but
ultimately “lost ground to optical-scan and electronic
systems”.17 By 2000, optical-scan ballots were used by 27.5%
of voters, second only in use to punch cards.18 However, that

Id.
Id.
12 Id. 1719-20.
13 Drew Desilver, On Election Day, Most Voters Use Electronic or
Optical-Scan Ballots, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 8, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/08/on-election-day-mostvoters-use-electronic-or-optical-scan-ballots/.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1721.
10
11
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same year accelerated the punch card’s decline. The nail in
the coffin came in the form of the “2000 Florida election
recount debacle that brought the term ‘hanging chad’” into
the cultural vocabulary. 19 This election demonstrated the
pitfalls of punch card voting as many issues arose
surrounding these ballots. Such issues included
misunderstandings over which punch-hole corresponded
with which candidate, cards being incompletely punched,
and
several
other
consistent
problems
with
decipherability.20
Ultimately, in the wake of the 2000 election, states
turned to electronic machines to avoid a prolonged and
contested ballot counting process.21 These states were aided
by a $3 billion federal investment in electronic voting
machines in response to the 2000 presidential election. 22
Additionally, many of these changes on the state-level were
now mandated.23
In 2002, the United States Congress passed the Help
America Vote Act (“HAVA”).24 The purpose of the Act was to
implement reform to the country’s voting process.25 HAVA
specifically addressed improvements to voting systems and
voter access that were identified as problems following the
2000 election. 26 HAVA created new mandatory minimum
standards for states to follow in multiple areas of election

Desilver, supra note 13.
Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1720.
21 Cory Bennet, States Ditch Electronic Voting Machines, THE HILL
(Nov. 3, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/222470states-ditch-electronic-voting-machines.
22 Id.
23 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666
(2002).
24 Id.
25 Presidential Statement on Signing the Help America Vote Act, 2002
WL 31421560 (Oct. 29, 2002).
26 Id.
19
20
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administration. 27 The Act also provided funding to assist
states in meeting those standards. 28 HAVA additionally
established the Election Assistance Commission (“EAC”) to
assist states in HAVA compliance and to distribute the Act’s
funds to the states.29 One of the Act’s loftiest goals was the
phasing out of punch-card voting systems and the
replacement of outdated voting machines.30
Ultimately, this move towards electronic voting
brought Direct Record Electronic Machines (“DREs”) into
precincts across the country. DRE machines were first
introduced in the 1970s, but did not rise to prominence until
the early 2000s. 31 They are “stand-alone machines that
record votes in their internal memories.”32 Crucially, DREs
were “only used by 10.7% of American voters” during the
2000 presidential election.” 33 Yet by the 2004 election,
28.9% of Americans were voting using DREs.34
Critically, after the 2000 election, concerns over
election technology were not only expressed in the
legislature, these same concerns were also echoed in the
American court system. Voting rights advocates in several
states “filed lawsuits seeking to require the replacement of
antiquated systems.” 35 While the lawsuits varied, each
relied on the Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore 36 ,
arguing “the use of different types of voting equipment with

Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666
(2002).
28 52 U.S.C. § 20901(b) (2018).
29 52 U.S.C. § 20921 (2018).
30 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666
(2002).
31 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1722.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Desilver, supra note 13.
35 Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1729.
36 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
27
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different levels of accuracy within a state violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.”37 For example, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) brought suit on behalf of Florida
voters to end punch card voting in the state. 38
Subsequently, the ACLU “brought lawsuits in Georgia,
Illinois, California, and Ohio on similar grounds.” 39
Plaintiffs argued in each of these cases that “the continuing
use of punch-card voting equipment denied their rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights
Act.” 40 Crucially, while the success of these lawsuits was
mixed 41 , this onslaught of litigation demonstrated an
appetite in the United States for drastic change in the
realm of election administration.
II.

Problems with Electronic Voting

The flaws in the American election system are widespread
and plaguing. Critically, this is true from the low to high
end of the voting technology spectrum. During every
election numerous votes are lost due to voting technology
shortcomings. 42 In 2008, the ten lowest failure rates (the
percent of votes cast, but not counted) among the states due
to voting technology and voter confusion fell below 0.5%.43
However, in states that fared worse, the rate of failure was

Tokaji, supra note 6, at 1729.
Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1729-30.
42 Adam Liptak, Lost Votes, Problem Ballots, Long Waits? Flaws Are
Widespread, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/02/06/us/politics/us-voting-flaws-are-widespreadstudy-shows.html.
43 Id.
37
38
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much higher. For example, in West Virginia the failure rate
was 3.2%,44 a concerning yet unsurprising figure.
In 2006, Princeton professor of computer science
Edward Felten obtained an AccuVote TS, one of the most
widely used touch-screen voting machines at the time. 45
Felten and his team began the process of reverseengineering the AccuVote TS. 46 In September 2006, they
published a research paper, and released a video, detailing
how code could be spread to an AccuVote TS, completely
changing the record of the votes to whatever outcome the
code writers desired.47 Furthermore, such code could spread
like a virus to other machines.48 Several other projects have
been performed on other direct-recording electronic voting
machines, showing similar results.49 Despite this, Georgia
still uses the AccuVote TS, and four other states—
Delaware, Louisiana, New Jersey and South Carolina—still
rely entirely on DRE machines. 50 This is critical, as the
machines that pose the greatest risk to election integrity
are electronic machines that leave no voter-verified paper
trail. 51 “If someone were to manipulate such a voting
machine’s underlying software, there would be no way to

Id.
Jessica Schulberg, Good News for Russia: 15 States Use Easily
Hackable Voting Machines, HUFFPOST (Jul. 17, 2017, 11:02 AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/electronic-voting-machines-hackrussia_us_5967e1c2e4b03389bb162c96.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 A.J. Vicens, Trump Says the Election Will Be Rigged. In These States,
It May Be Impossible to Prove Him Wrong, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 9,
2016, 4:59 PM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/08/millionsvoters-could-cast-ballots-machines-leave-no-paper-trail/.
44
45
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prove it by comparing the machine’s vote count to a paper
record.”52
This sentiment was echoed in June 2017 when more
than 100 cybersecurity and voting experts penned a letter to
Congress suggesting several objectives for protecting the
integrity of the election system. 53 The letter came in the
wake of Jeanette Manfra, Acting Deputy Undersecretary for
Cybersecurity and Communications at the Department of
Homeland Security, notifying the Senate Intelligence
Committee that hackers targeted election-related systems
in 21 states during the 2016 election cycle.54 Critically, in
the letter, the experts state, “all jurisdictions should create
voter-verified paper ballots and phase out electronic voting
machines” to handle the increase in cybersecurity risks.55
While there has never been a proven case of
manipulation of an electronic voting machine, that does not
indicate their infallibility. In fact, the greatest downfall of
electronic voting machines might come in the form of their
aging software and imperfect engineering. DRE machines,
without any known malicious tampering, have historically
produced questionable results. 56 In Florida, “more than
18,000 iVotronic machines did not record a vote in a 2006
congressional race in which the margin of victory was less
than 400 votes.”57 Meanwhile, in Fairfax County, Virginia,
“electronic machines subtracted one vote for every hundred

Id.
Selena Larson, 100 Experts Tell Congress How to Improve Election
Security, CNN (Jun. 21, 2017, 1:30 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/
21/technology/voter-security-letter-sent-to-congress/index.html.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Andy Sullivan, Despite Flaws, Paperless Voting Machines Remain
Widespread in the U.S., REUTERS (Sep. 20 2016, 7:38 AM), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-machines/despite-flaws-paperlessvoting-machines-remain-widespread-in-the-u-s-idUSKCN11Q0EU.
57 Id.
52
53
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cast for one candidate in a 2003 school-board race.” 58
Further “more than 4,400 electronic ballots in Carteret
County, North Carolina, were lost and never recovered in
the 2004 presidential election.”59 These events highlight the
very real consequences these machines can impose when
glitches occur.
These DRE machines may also jeopardize election
integrity simply due to the passage of time. As most DRE
machines were purchased in the wake of the 2000 election
debacle, the age of these devices raises real concerns.60 For
machines purchased since 2000, the expected lifespan for
the core components is generally between ten and fifteen
years.61 This is worrisome, as the oldest voting machines in
forty-three states were at least ten years old by the 2016
election. 62 In fourteen states they were more than fifteen
years old.63
One of the most obvious problems with aging
equipment is calibration. A number of voting machines still
in commission rely on hardware from the 1990s to calibrate
their screens.64 Often at polling places, the accuracy of the
calibration of these machines noticeably degrades
throughout the day. 65 This has led to complaints of “vote

Id.
Id.
60 Lawrence Norden & Christopher Famighetti, America’s Voting
Machines at Risk, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 9 (2015), https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Americas_Voting_Mac
hines_At_Risk.pdf.
61 Id. at 4.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Pam Fessler, Some Machines Are Flipping Votes, But That Doesn’t
Mean They’re Rigged, NPR (Oct. 26, 2016, 1:13 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/10/26/499450796/some-machines-are-flippingvotes-but-that-doesnt-mean-theyre-rigged.
65 Id.
58
59
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flipping”.66 In Texas, during the 2016 election, a number of
“voters in at least three counties reported they had selected
straight Republican tickets, only to have Clinton/Kaine pop
up instead of Trump/Pence.” 67 Most election officials are
aware of the problem of aging voter technology, but have
come up against tightened state and county budgets,
resulting in the replacement of these machines as
unfeasible. 68 This is not surprising as estimates suggest
replacing old electronic voting machines in the United
States could top $1 billion.69
III.

STATE REVERSION FROM ELECTRONIC
VOTING

Since the late 2000s, many states have passed legislation
reverting away from electronic voting. 70 Maryland was
among the first states to abandon paper balloting after the
2000 presidential election.71 The state spent $65 million in
2002 to buy electronic voting machines from Diebold,
Incorporated.72 However, issues with these machines arose
shortly after. For example, in Maryland’s 2006 primary
election, glitches plagued the polling stations leading state

66 “Vote flipping” is the act of an electronic voting machine recording a
vote for the opposite selection chosen by the voter. Id.
67 Id.
68 Lawrence Norden & Chistopher Famighetti, Now Is the Time to
Replace Our Decrepit Voting Machines, SLATE (Nov. 17, 2016, 12:07
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/11/now
_is_the_time_to_fix_our_old_voting_machines.html.
69 Id.
70 Cory Bennet, States Ditch Electronic Voting Machines, THE HILL
(Nov. 3, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/222470states-ditch-electronic-voting-machines.
71 Erin Cox, New Voting Machines Finally On Horizon, BALT. SUN (Dec.
16, 2014, 8:50 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/
politics/bs-md-voting-machines-20141216-story.html.
72 Id.
542
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leaders to “urge voters to cast paper absentee ballots
instead.”73
Thus, in 2007, the Maryland General Assembly
unanimously passed Chapter 548 of the 2007 Acts. 74 This
bill required a new voter-verifiable paper record voting
system to replace the touchscreen voting system, which had
proven susceptible to hacks and glitches.75 However, budget
concerns delayed funding for the new system until 2014, as
estimates indicated switching to the voter-verifiable paper
system would cost the state $28.1 million.76 Ultimately, the
State Board of Elections’ contract to lease new voting
equipment was finalized in December 2014, and the system
was used for the first time in the 2016 presidential
election. 77 Other states like California and Ohio, have
addressed the issue by adding printers to their touch-screen
machines allowing for a backup paper trail if necessary.78
In the summer of 2017, the Virginia State Board of
Elections also moved to do away with touchscreen voting
machines, imposing the state’s November elections as the
deadline for phasing out all such machines.79 This decision
came in the wake of Virginia’s Department of Elections
recommending the decertification of touchscreen voting
machines.80 The recommendation was made “after security

Id.
2007 Bill Text MD H.B. 18 (May 17, 2007).
75 Id.
76 Voting Systems, MD. STATE BD. OF ELEC., http://www.elections.state.
md.us/voting_system/learn_about_the_new_voting_system.html.
77 Id.
78 Andy Sullivan, Despite Flaws, Paperless Voting Machines Remain
Widespread in the U.S., REUTERS (Sep. 20 2016, 7:38 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-machines/despite-flawspaperless-voting-machines-remain-widespread-in-the-u-sidUSKCN11Q0EU.
79 Id.
80 Id.
73
74
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experts breached numerous types of voting machines with
ease at the DEF CON cybersecurity conference in Las Vegas
in July 2017. 81 It is also not coincidental that the move
came amid “heightened concerns over foreign interference
in future elections, in light of the U.S. intelligence
community’s conclusion that Russia used cyber-attacks and
disinformation to interfere in the 2016 presidential
election.” 82 This however was not the first time Virginia
faced dilemmas in regards to voting technology. In 2015
Virginia decertified thousands of insecure WinVote
machines. 83 A security researcher describing the matter
stated, anyone within a half mile could have modified every
vote, undetected without any technical expertise. 84
Therefore, the serious implications of these security
vulnerabilities are beginning to be addressed at the state
level.
IV.

THE STATE OF ELECTRONIC VOTING
TODAY

Today, there are many ways Americans cast their votes.
Roughly 80% of Americans vote with paper ballots or vote
on machines that leave a paper trail.85 However, that leaves
20% of Americans casting ballots with no paper record.
Voters in “Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New Jersey, and
South Carolina all use machines with no paper trail, as do

Id.
Id.
83 Kim Zetter, Virginia Finally Drops America’s ‘Worst Voting Machines’,
WIRED (Aug. 17, 2015 7:00 am), https://www.wired.com/2015/08/virg
inia-finally-drops-americas-worst-voting-machines/.
84 Id.
85 A.J. Vicens, Trump Says the Election Will Be Rigged. In These States,
It May Be Impossible to Prove Him Wrong, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 9,
2016, 4:59 PM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/08/millionsvoters-could-cast-ballots-machines-leave-no-paper-trail/.
81
82
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voters in some parts of Texas, Tennessee, Indiana,
Kentucky, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Kansas,
Mississippi, and Florida.” 86 These counties, in sum, had
more than 60 million registered voters as of November
2014, a sizable portion of the entire voting population.87 The
scale of this problem is particularly troubling, as errors,
whether malicious or unintentional, could alter the results
of not only state and local elections, but also national
elections. Thus, this problem concerns voters regardless of
whether they reside in jurisdictions that use non paperverifiable voting methods.
V.

IMPLICATIONS IN THE STATES

The 2016 presidential election demonstrated the particular
vulnerabilities of electronic voting systems. On November 8,
2016, in Durham, N.C., electronic poll books used to check
voter registration malfunctioned in the morning, forcing
voters to wait in long lines and use paper back-up copies.88
In response, the Southern Coalition for Social Justice filed a
lawsuit “in hopes of forcing the Durham County Board of
Elections to keep polls open an additional 90 minutes.” 89
Ultimately, voting was “extended by the state Board of
Elections for up to an hour in eight precincts affected by the
malfunctions.”90

Id.
Id.
88 Mark Berman, William Wan, & Sari Horwitz, Voters Encounter Some
Malfunctioning Machines, Other Headaches on Election Day, WASH.
POST (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/
wp/2016/11/08/election-day-voters-report-long-lines-intimidation-andconfusion-in-some-parts-of-the-country/?utm_term=.b5b16ae87eeb.
89 Id.
90 Id.
86
87
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Meanwhile, in Colorado “portions of the state’s voterverification system went down for about 30 minutes in the
afternoon, briefly forcing state officials to issue provisional
ballots to an undisclosed number of voters, and also briefly
preventing them from processing mail ballots.” 91 In
Washington County, Utah, election officials had “to
scramble to get electronic voting machines back up and
running after machines at many precincts failed to operate
immediately after polls opened at 7 a.m.”92 Only 99 of the
380 machines had correctly programmed memory cards. 93
Similar electronic voting machine malfunctions slowed lines
in Philadelphia, Detroit, and Manhattan.94
On the other hand, in Maryland, where paper ballots
were utilized for the first time in over a decade, some voters
also faced delays. 95 In Baltimore County, voters reported
more than two-hour waits in precincts with only one ballot
scanner. 96 In several polling places the scanners broke
down, “requiring voters to place their ballot sheets into
secured boxes affixed to the machines”. 97 However,
ultimately, fewer than 20 of the 2,900 ballot scanners
malfunctioned on Election Day in the state, a relative
success. 98 A far better result than in 2004 where reports

Richard Wolf & Kevin McCoy, Voters in Key States Endured Long
Lines, Equipment Failures, USA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2016, 6:03 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/11/08/votin
g-polls-election-day/93201770/.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Doug Donovan & Scott Dance, Election Hiccups in Maryland: Delays,
Long Lines, Adjusting to Paper Ballots, BALT. SUN (Nov. 8, 2016 10:52
p.m.), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-electi
on-day-20161108-story.html.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
91
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showed “voters in three counties never even saw the Senate
primary on their voting machine screens.”99
Beyond the typical malfunctions and glitches,
malicious hacking also plagued the 2016 presidential
election. While there is no evidence of manipulation of
voting or tabulation machines, breaches of election-related
data did occur. 100 For example, in Arizona and Illinois,
Russian hackers breached the states’ internet-linked voter
registration databases.101 The exposure of these registration
databases is particularly troubling as in nearly every state,
one cannot vote if he or she is not registered.102 Thus, such
breaches can indirectly affect election integrity.
Furthermore, these breaches, regardless of their direct
impact, can have further repercussions by undermining
public confidence in the election system’s integrity more
broadly.103

Merrill Fabry, A Brief History of Voting Problems on Election Day,
TIME (Nov. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4531415/history-voting-problemselection-day/.
100 Ellen Nakashima, Russian Hackers Targeted Arizona Election
System, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/fbi-is-investigating-foreign-hacks-of-stateelection-systems/2016/08/29/6e758ff4-6e00-11e6-8365-b19e428a975e
_story.html?utm_term=.4d78656ea220.
101 Id.
102 Eli Watkins, How to Register to Vote in Every U.S. State and
Territory, CNN (Oct. 12, 2016), https://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/14/
politics/how-to-register-to-vote-in-every-us-state-and-territory/
index.
html.
103 Massimo Calabresi, Election Hackers Altered Voter Rolls, Stole
Private Data, Officials Say, TIME (Jun. 22, 2017), http://time.com/
4828306/russian-hacking-election-widespread-private-data/.
99

Journal of Business & Technology Law



547

From Hanging Chads to Data Hacks

VI.

THE CASE FOR SECURE AND STANDARD
VOTING TECHNOLOGY

Ultimately, voting technology is almost entirely controlled
at the state level. 104 In the United States there are no
mandatory standards for voting technologies set by the
federal government. 105 However, there are voluntary
standards for computer-based voting systems developed by
the Federal Election Commission at the direction of
Congress.106 Additionally, the administration of elections is
nearly always handled at the county or local level.107 As a
result of this form of administration, there is a great
amount of variability regarding the way Americans vote
from precinct to precinct. In fact, almost all states use more
than one voting technology, and a number of states use all
five forms of technology.108 Thus, the United States, which
began its democracy with only one method for casting votes,
now has a patchwork approach to voting that has only been
exacerbated in recent decades by the introduction of several
new voting technologies.109 Despite this variance in voting
methods, what the various jurisdictions have in common is
plaguing election administration concerns over efficiency
and reliability.
Interestingly, a natural convergence among the
states, in regards to resolving these issues, is currently
occurring. Voting through the use of scan-technology has

Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666
(2002).
105 Id.
106 52 U.S.C. § 20921 (2018).
107 Election Administration at State and Local Levels, NAT’L CONF. OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (Jun. 15, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/election-administration-at-state-and-locallevels.aspx.
108 Desilver, supra note 13.
109 Id.
104
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been occupying an increasingly larger portion of precincts
since 2006. 110 This is a positive trend as it indicates a
solution to these ongoing dilemmas might finally be
emerging. While no solution can fix every problem, scantechnology appears to be the most effective in this regard.
Furthermore, this trend is likely to continue as more than
40 out of 50 states have plans to update their voting
machinery before the 2020 election.111
This shift to scanned ballots is likely to address many
of the issues seen consistently throughout the spectrum of
voting technology. Paper ballots are generally considered
superior to electronic voting machines in terms of
verifiability.112 Even machines that are high end and well
maintained cannot sufficiently address the systemic issues
of electronic voting. The inability to manually recount, to
properly audit, to prevent rigging and widespread fraud,
simply cannot be divorced from DRE machines. 113 Yet,
simply relying on paper ballots is time consuming in terms
of counting, and as a result, a nearly obsolete practice.114
Scanned ballots overcome this issue of efficiency, while still
offering a back-up trail to identify inconsistencies and verify
results if issues do arise. 115 Furthermore, scanned ballots
address the issue of decipherability due to human variance,
as the scanner indicates if a form is not sufficiently
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readable, by adhering to certain standards of readability
which are necessary for a scanner to function properly.116
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the pendulum of American electoral politics has
swung back in favor of paper-verifiable voting methods, and
this trend seems likely to stay. While direct recording
electronic voting is incredibly efficient in terms of ballot
counting, it simply is too vulnerable to attacks, and does not
offer a sufficient fallback so that in the event of a failure,
glitch, or attack, the integrity of the vote count is not
compromised. On the other end of the spectrum, low
technology voting, such as print-ballots, is relatively time
consuming, labor intensive, and error-prone due to
indecipherability and human mistake. Thus, since 2000, as
states moved rapidly from one end of this voting technology
spectrum to the other, many of the problems of election
integrity remained uncorrected.
Ultimately, the nation is now witnessing a period of
correction. Many states are now moving towards a middle
ground that incorporates both levels of technology. This is
scan-voting technology. This model incorporates the
efficiency of high technology voting whilst offering the peace
of mind low-technology voting offers. If errors occur, there is
a corresponding paper ballot, to ensure verifiability is not
lost. Thus it is not surprising that 47% of registered voters
live in areas that now use scan-voting technology, with this
number projected to rise. 117 Meanwhile, since 2006 direct
recording electronic voting has occupied an increasingly
smaller percentage of voting precincts, while punch cards
and paper ballots have nearly disappeared.118 Considering
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the continued issues with DRE voting integrity, and the
relative inefficiency and risk of human error associated with
low technology voting, this trend is logical.
Voting technology in the United States stands as a
reminder of the importance of centered responses. Each
election cycle, the nation endeavors to rectify issues learned
from past elections, however, this has led to over correction
and the discovery of new obstacles to election integrity.
These endeavors have often come at a lofty price.
Ultimately, however, in the last decade states have
reckoned
with
this
conundrum,
and
responded
appropriately, leading the nation to a much-needed, and
increasingly
closer,
standard
voting
technology
equilibrium—the shift towards scan-voting technology.
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